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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
FRANKLIN DUANE
ROBISON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No.

vs.

10034

ALLISON ROBISON 1and
THORPE ROBISON,
Defendants and Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE

The appellant has appealed from a decision of
the Fifth District Court, Millard County, granting
the respondents' summ ary judgment against the appellant's claim that respondents were liable to him
for injuries sustained when he was struck by a rock
on the respondents' land while assisting in blasting
operations.
1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

Upon motion of the respondents based upon
the depositions of the parties, the Honorable C. Nelson Day, Judge, granted summ'ary judgment against
appellant and ruled that the appellant had assumed
the risk of his injury.
1
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondents submit that the trial court
properly granted summary judgment ~against the
appellant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondents submit the following statement of facts as being a more correct recital of the
evidence.
The evidence before the court consisted of the
depositions of the appellant and respondents. There
were no affidavits or other indication tha:t any contrary evidence was available.
The appellant's deposition will be cited as
(A.D.), the respondents ( R.D.), and the record
(R.).

The trial court entered a memorandum decision, which, it is submitted, w:as based primarily
upon the appellant's testimony (R. 14-16). In addition, the trial court indicated that it did not feel
the concept of absolute liability was applicable to
the instant case, but felt the amended complaint did
state :a cause of action based upon an allegation of
negligence (R. 15, 16). However, the court ruled
that in any event the appellant had assumed the
risk ('R. 14-16) or was himself negligent.
On May 1, 1962 the respondents were engaged
in ·constructing a ditch upon land which they l~ased
from a third person. At no time did any of- the
adtions complained of occur off of the respondents
2
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property (App. Deposition A.D. p. 35). The construction was in a non-populous farming area in
Millard County.
In the morning the appellant rode a horse over
to the respondents' property to see how the work
on the ditch was progressing, (A.D. p. 21-24) stayed
for about 30 minutes and left (A.D. 23). He did not
at 1any time come onto the respondents' property at
their invitati'on, but instead was allowed to watch
and assist as a neighbor.! Later on the same day
at about 1:30 or 2:00 p.m. the appellant again rode
back to the respondents' property where dynamite
blasting operations were being conducted (A.D. 26).
He observed that the respondents and one Nolan
Jackson were blasting and using dynamite (R. 1'5).
The appellant, contrary to the !assertion in his brief,
had seen blasting on a prior occasion, although quite
awhile prior to the instant event (A.D. 34). Further, the appellant is a mature married man in his
middle years (A.D. 34).
Upon arrival appellant discussed the blasting
operations with the respondents and suggested using
a ''bull prick drill" in preparing the rock for blasting (A.D. 27). He observed the respondents preparing a blast, rode back out of danger, got off
his horse and into a pickup truck while a dynamite
blast was made (A.D. 28-29). He noticed the distance of the blast (R. 15) and went back to the
1

1 Contrary to appellants' assertion, this would not make the appellant a guest rather he would be a bare 'licensee. Prosser, Torts 2nd
Ed., p. 445, 446.
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blasting site while a second blast was prepared
(A.D. 27-29). !The second preparation did not explode, and the parties returned to the blast site.
An addi tiona I half stick of dynamite was added,
which appellant observed, land rocks, and mud plater
were placed on the dynamite (R. 15). The appellant suggested putting a big rock on the dynamite,
and gave advice to respondents on the blasting.
(A.D. '28, 3'3). From this time on the appellant can
no longer remember what occurred (A.D. 30, 34).
Although !appellant in his brief suggests the possibility of a misfire or early explosion before he had
time to get away, his deposition clearly shows no
evidentiary basis for this supposition since he clearly stated he could not remember what occurred,
apparently because of his injury (R. 30, 34).
The depositions of the other witnesses show
that prior to the blast the ~appellant had observed
the setting of the fuse, recommended a rock tamp,
got on his horse and rode about 450 feet from the
blast site ( R. 1'5) . The respondents' depos1 tions are
to the effect that the appellant placed rocks on the
dynamite, there is no doubt but that he recommended
such procedure (A.D. 29). The respondents drove
their trucks to the s'ame ar~a where the appellant
was sitting on his horse ( R. 15) . Appellant did not
get off his horse but remained in the saddle awaiting the blast. The dynamite exploded and a rock
struck the appellant in the head.
All the blasting occurred on the respondents'
4
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own farm lands and the injury to appellant also occurred on the respondents' lands. The trial judge,
based upon the evidence, determ'ined that the appelland was negligent and assumed the risk (R. 16).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DOCTRINE OF ABSOLUTE I.;IABfLITY IS
NOT APPLIC.A!BLE IN UTAH TO THE INSTANT CASE.

'The trial court ruled that the instant case did
not raise a fact situration where the rule of absolute
liability should be applied. The blasting in this case
was being conducted in a remote rural unpopulated
area in support of the construction of an irrigation
ditch. At no time did any trespass occur to neighboring lands nor was the appellant injured while
on his own property.
It is recognized that there is some authority
supporting a contention tha:t the common law rule
imposing strict liability for the carrying on of an
ultrahazardous activity on one's lands which causes
injury to another (Rylands v. Fletcher, 1866 L.R.
1 Ex. 265) is applicable to blasting, 20 A.L.R. 2d
1372. However, there is substantial support for the
contrary rule requiring proof of negligence. Bacon
v. Kansas City Terminal R. Co., 109 Kan. 234, 19'8
Bac. 942; Reynolds v. W. H. Henman Co., 75 Atl.
2d 802 (Me. 1950); 20 A.L.R. 2d 1360. California
has apparently taken the position that engaging in
blasting will impose absolute liability in a crowded
5
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area for any damages arising as a result of the
blasting, 20 A.L.R. 2d 1382 ( 1950), but that negligence must be shown where the blasting occurs in
a remote area, Alonso v. Hills, 95 Cal. App. 2d 778,
214 P. 2d 50 ( 1950). Several of the most recent decisions have refused to apply the absolute liability
concept and have required a showing of fault based
on negligence, Boonville Collieries Corp. v. Reynolds,
163 N.E. 2d 6'27 (Ind. App.); Dallon v. Demos Bros.,
135 N.E. 2d 646 (Mass.); 20 ALR 2d 1360. The
doctri'ne of ra;bsolu te liability has been soundly criticized by legal scholars, Prosser, Torts 2nd Ed., Sec.
59.
'The obvious basis for criticism is thJat such a
concept dispenses with fault thus socializing liability without socializing responsibility for the loss.
Thayer, Liability Without Fault, 29 Har. L. Rev.
801 (1916). Further, the obvious objection exists
that to declare a function as ultra-hazardous and
thus impose strict lia:bility ignores the fact that in
some circumstances an activity may be quite safe,
whereas under others, land with subsequent knowledge, the same activity may be perfectly safe. As
is noted, Stallybrass, Dangerous Things and NonNatural User of Land, 3 Camb. L. J. 376, 387
( 192'9) :
" ... just as there is nothing which is at all
times ;and in all circumstances dangerous, so
'it seems that there is scarcely anything which
is in all circumstances safe."
This probably accounts for the position of the Calif1

1
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ornia courts that negligence must be shown before
liability is imposed from blasting in remote areas,
Alonso v. Hills, supra. Indeed the use of dynJamite
is comparatively safe when viewed against other
modern day industrial 'activities.
The decisions imposing strict liability for blasting have most often done so on the basis of trespass,
arguing that the concussion or debris leaving the
land results in a trespass onto the land of another.
Prosser, Torts 2nd Ed. Sec. 59; Madsen v. East Jordan In·. Co., 101 Utah 55'2, 125 P. 2d 794 (1942).
The Utah Supreme Court has not directly passed on
the matter, and it is submitted should not follow the
rule of absolute liability. In llfadsen v. East Jordan
bT. Co., supra., plaintiff sued for loss of mink he
claimed to have suffered as the result of the defendant's blasting which frightened his mink and caused them to slaughter their young. The main opinion
notes the division of authority on the question of
absolute liability and further notes that at that
time the majority rule applied the concept of strict
liability. However, the court did not have to decide
which concept to follow. It held that the disposition
of the animals to ki 11 their young was such an intervening cause that the loss could not be said to be the
result of the defendant's blasting. Justice Wolfe,
however, concurring, made it clear that negligence
would have to be shown to permit recovery. He noted
that in O'Neill v. San Pedro R.R. Co., '38 Utah 475,
11-! Pac. 127, the court had required proof of negli7
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gence for vibration damage due to the operation of
trains, and had rejected the theory of trespass. He
therefore reasoned that in a claim for blast damage, due to vibration, negligence would also have
to be shown. Since in the insta:nt case there is no
trespass, the proper pleading would be trespass on
the case and negligence would have to be alleged
and proved.2 As noted by Justice Wolfe: "Being an
action in case, negligence must be alleged and
proved.''
It would seem, therefore, that what Utah precedent there is would not apply the concept of strict
liability in this case. In Stevens-Salt Lake City v.
Wong, 1'23 Utah 309, 259 P. 2d 586 (1'953), the
court refused to apply a concept of strict liability
to bursting water pipes that caused water to escape
into plaintiff's building.a The court noted that even
if the concepit of strict liability were to be adopted
it would, based on California precedent (Green v.
General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 Pac.
952) , only be applicable where there is a showing
that the defendant 1acted ''deliberately" under
"known conditions, and, with knowledge that injury may result." Even applying the concept to the
instant case it would appear plaintiff could not
recover since that rule is merely another way of
alleging negligence, Harper & J1ames, The Law of
2 The appellant's amended c'omplaint did allege negligence but he
apparently abandoned th'is position on appeal in favor of absolute
liaJbility.
3 ·Thus rejecting the Rylands v. Fletcher, supra., concept
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Torts, Sec. 14.7, p. 817. Since if the defendants
did an act, knowing that injury was likely, this it~rlf may be negligence. Further, the respondents
certainly did not deliberately do a dangerous act
knowing that injury may result. Indeed the injury
in this circumstance Wlas probably unforseeable and
thus outside the realm of proximate cause, Kleppsch
v. Donald 4 Wash. 436, 30 Pac. 991 (1892). In
addition, this court has refused to recognize liability
for flooding damage in the absence of prayer of
negligence. In Brain v. Fremont Irr. Co., 186 Pac.
2d 588, 112 Utah 220, (Utah 1'947), this court ruled
that a complaint failed to state a cause of action
based on flood damage where there was no allegation of negligence.
Since the Utah precedent :seems to reject the
application of strict liability it would appear that
the plaintiff does not have a cause of action based
on that theory.
Secondly it is submitted an additional reason
exists in this case why the rule is not properly applicable, that being tba:t there was no "escape"
from the defendant's lands. The only case that appears to have directly considered the issue has held
the concept of strict liability inapplicable to an explosion injuring a person where there was no escape
from the premises. In Read v. J. Lyons Company,
1947, A.C. 1'56, a land mark decision, the House
of Lords so ruled noting that the Ryln,nds v. Fletcher
case had required such escape. The ·appellant, an
9
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arm1aments worker, was injured when a shell exploded on the premises where she was employed.
She claimed recovery on the basis of strict liability.
Viscount 1Simon noted:
"'The duties of an occupier of premises to an
invitee have been analysed in many reported
cases, but in none of them, I think, is there
any hint of the proposition necessary to support the claim of the a ppellian t in this case.

*

*

*

Now the strict liability recogn1zed by this
House to exist in Rylands v. Fletcher is conditioned by two elements which I may call
the condition of 'escape' from the land of
something likely to do miscHief if it escapes,
and the condition of "non-natural use" of the
land."
'Thus the House of Lords properly reasoned
thJat escape is essential to the strict liability rule,
since if the injured person is otherwise on the lands
where the activity is being carried on the legal rules
applicable to licensees, guests, and invitees are applicable, which requires negligence to be shown. It
should further be noted that Lord MacMillan felt
strict lianility was no longer applicable in England:
"In my opinion the appellant's statement of
claim discloses no ground of action against
respondents. The action is one of damages
for personal injuries. Whatever may h!ave
been the law of England in early times I am
of opinion that as the law now stands an allegation of negligence is in general essential to
the relevancy of an action of reparation for
personal injuries.''
10
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The fact that the jurisdiction which first adopted the strict liability rule has apparently retreated
only accentuates the need for a more fleXible rule.
Prosser, Torts 2nd Ed., p. 336, speaking of the more
modern tl·end with reference to blasting cases notes:
"Many of the l;ater cases have come to the
conclusion that this strict liabilitity is entirely a question of when and how, and that
the use of explosives on an uninhabited mountainside is a matter of negligence only, but
that anyone who blasts in the center of a l:arge
city does so at his peril.'' 4
Further evidence of a withdrawal from the
common law concept of strict liability is the position
evidenced by the Restatement of Torts, Sec. 519,
520. The later section defines a·n "ultrahazardous
activity" as requiring two elements. First, the likelihood of harm irrespective of the standard of care,
and secondly, that the activity be one that "is not
a matter of common usage." Prosser, Torts 2nd Ed.,
p. 335. Certainly, the technique of blasting has gone
far beyond the days of Nobel, land in most farm
communities the use of dynamite is a common mra:tter,
especially in conjunction with irrigation activities.
Since World War II the techniques of demolition
have advanced to where there is no need for a strict
rule of absolute liability.
1

4 Prosser cites cases from jurisdictions in the west whose problems
and environments ·proximate those of Utah. Bedell v. Goulter, 199
Or. 344, 261 P. 2d 842 (1953); Alonso v. HiUs, supra., (Cal.); Freebury v. Chicago, M. & P.S.R. Co., 77 Wash. 464, 137 Pac. 1044
(1914); Cashin v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 96 Mont. 92, 28 P. 2d 862
~19~~). Wyoming has completely rejected the concept of absolute
1Iabllity, Jacoby v. Town of Gillette, 62 Wyo. 487, 174 P. 2d 505
( 1947).

11
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Additionally, the usual concepts of the duty of
a landowner to a licensee are in conflict with the
theory of absolute liability. Generally courts have
based their theories of absolute liability of trespass,
and most cases have involved concussion damage.
THis is substantially different than elevating the
duty to a licensee to one of absolute liability because
of an activity carried on one's own premises not endangering the community at l:arge. A West Virginia
Federal Court recognized the distinction in Fairfax
Inn Inc. v. Sunnyhill Mining Co., 97 F. Supp. 991
(N.D. W. Va. 19'51), again a trespass concussion
case where the court commented on the limited duty
of a landowner in the absence of trespass. !The court
concerned itself with a West Virgini1a State case that
had refused to find liability for the escape of a circus tiger and compared that with the trespass concussion situa~ion. It stated:
"It also seems to me that there is at least one
vital distinction between the Vaughan case
and the case at bar. Vaughan, voluntarily
and of his own free will, went upon the property of the defendant and placed himself
in a position to be injured. The defendant
owed him only the du!ty that devolves upon the
owner of property when someone, even though
he be an invitee or licensee, comes on the
property. In the case at bar, the defendant
caused waves of shock or concussion to travel
from his property onto the plaintiff's property."
Analogous to the court's reasoning is that of
12
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the House of Lords to Read v. J. Lyons Company,
supra., requiring "escape."
Thus the many compelling and obvious reasons
set out above dictates !a decision contrary to the concept of strict liability being urged by the appellant.
POINT II
THE A:PPELLANT ASSUMED THE RISK.

The t:rial court ruled that irrespective of the
test of liability to be applied in the instant case that
the appellant should be denied recovery since as
a m·atter of law he had assumed the risk, and was
himself negligent. The facts 'in this regard show
that at the time the appellant was injured he was
upon the respondents' premises of his own choice.
He observed that blasting with dynamite was taking place on the premises, and still rem:ained. Appellan t had had some prior experience with the use
of explosives and was a mature middle-aged man.
He was present during one ·blast where he removed
himself to a safe distance :and got into a truck for
protection. Thereafter he discussed blasting procedures and recommended placing a 'large rock on
the dynamite. Mter preparation of the charge appellant rode a distance away from the site of the
blast, but he did not dismount nis horse and seek
protection in the truck. He had observed all the
preparations for blasting. 'He was not an employee of
the respondents or an independent contractor who
might suffer economic loss by not leaving the blast
area. He voluntarily remained as an interested spec13
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tator knowing full well the dangers involved. Under these circumstances it is clear that the trial
court's determination that appelliant assumed the
risk is correct.
In Jacques v. Farimond, 14 Utah 2d 166, 380
P. 2d 133 (1963) this court noted:
'~The denial of recovery because of assumption of risk of willful misconduct is based upon
the same reasoning as in a case of ordin:ary
negligence: that the pla'intiff knew and appreciated the ·hazards; that he had a reasona:ble opportunity to make an alternative
choice; and that he voluntarily assumed the
risk. In both cases the underlying principle is
that one who fails to use reasonable care for
his own safety, which contributes to cause his
injury, should not be permitted to recover
from another for 'it."
This is the accepted ,standard of determining
assumption of risk. In the instant case appel1ant
clearly appreciated the risks involved, volunteered
to pa~tici pate although he had no economic or other
compulsion to do so, and could have left at anytime
he desired.
The Restatement of Torts, Sec. 523, notes that
the concept of allowing recovery for injuries due to
ultra-hazardous activities does not apply in certain
instances:
"The rule stated in Sec. 519 does not apply
where the person harmed by the unpreventa:ble miscarriage of an ultl1a-hazardous activity has reason to know of the risk which
makes the activity ultrahazardous and
(a) takes part in it, or
1
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(b) brings himself wi th1n the :area
which will be endangered by its
miscarriage."
Under the Restatement test it is clear that the
appellant's cause of action, if any he had, is barred
because in this case :appellant 'both took part in the
acti vi ty and brought himse If within the danger
area.
Prosser, Torts 2nd Ed., p. 342, also notes that
assumption of risk is a defense in absolute liability
cases. See also Worth v. Dunn, 98 Conn. 51, 1'18 Atl.
467 ( 1922) ; Wells v. Knight, 32 R.I. 432, 80 Atl.
16 ( 1911). The Arizona Supreme Court in Twohy
Bros. v. Kepon, 21 Ariz. 606, 193 Pac. 296 (19 20),
denied liability for blasting injury where the plaintiff with notice remained in the area and was familiar with the fact that blasting work was being
carried on in the ;area. 'This rule has been followed
in Le~"t·ington & Eastern Ry. Co. v. Fields, 1'5·2 Ky.
19, 153 S.W. 43 ( 1913) ; Adams' Admr. v. Callis &
Hughes, 253 Ky. 382, 69 S.W. 2d 711 (19'34);
Graetz v. McKenzie, 9 Wash. 696, 3 5 Pa'c. 377
(1893).
In Smith v. Day, 117 Fed. 956 (1902), the
court ruled tbat plaintiff had assumed the risk in
going on the premises knowing of the danger attendant to blasting. The court noted:
"The plaintiff and his fellow passengers went
upon the premises where the blasting was being done with their eyes open. Their right
there, whether it was a ngh't by sufference
or license, implied or otherwise, was subordin1

1

1
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ate to the right of the defendants to prosecute
the work in which they were engaged. These
passengers assumed all risks necessarily incident 'to such work . . ."
In Wells v. Knight, 3'2 R.I. 432, 80 Alt. 16
( 1911) , 'blasting was being done on ia bridge. The
deceased had warning of lthe blasts, watched 'as to
where the stones were falling, and then proceeded
along a path which he apparently felt gafe. Thereafter, another blast went off which ki'lled the deceased when he was struck by a stone. The court
held that the evidence was sufficient to require a
finding of contributory negligence, which under the
Rhode Island requirement of showing primary negligence would support a fi'nding of :assumption of
risk also. A simHar conclusion on a like factual basis
was reached by the Ari~ona court in Twohy Bros.
v. Kepon, 21 Ariz. 606, 193 Pac. 296 (1920).
In Adams' Adm'r. v. Callis & Hughes, 'supva.,
the deceased was the owner of an adoining quarry.
Each quarry would give notice to the other before
blasting. The deceased had notice of the 'impending
blast and had opportunity to reach safety. He took
only limited precautions. The court held he had
assumed the risk.
See also Cary Bros. & Hannon v. Morrisson,
12'9 Fed. 177 ( 1904), holding th'at one having knowledge of the conditions 'Of blasting who remains in
the area i's guilt of contributory negligence in assuming the r'isk.
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The cases cited by the appellant involved situations distinctly different from that of the instant
case. The persons concerned in the cwses cited by
appellant were often hound by 1an employment situation which limited their free choice. Secondly, there
was no participation by the persons 'in the actual
blasting, and little time for the individual to truely
avail himself of a safe position. None of the cases
have application in the instant ~situation. All things
being considered it is clear the trial court ruled
correctly, Jacques v. Farimond, supra.

CONCLUSION
The appelliant's contentions on 'appe'al afford
him no basis for reversal. Appellant has argued for
the doctrine of absolute liabililty. A:lthough in Madsen v. East Jordan Irrigation Co., 101 Utah 552,
1~5 P. '2d 794 (1942), Justice Pratt ~acknowledged
that at that time a:bsolute li'a:bility was the majority
rule, the court did not pass on its application in Utah
since (1) the parties had conceded the application
of the rule for the 'appeal and ( 2) the only issue was
proximate cause. Since the court now has :an opportunity for the first time to examine the rule ih light
of the more flexible rules now being applied and
contrary Utah decisions, it should reject the doctrine
in this case.
Further, irrespective of the applicability rule
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the uncontroverted facts, based upon Appellant's
deposition, show thalt appellant assumed the risk
of injury.
This court should affirm.
Respectively submi'tted,
HANSON & BALDWIN and
REX J. HANSON
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